By Dr Alexander Shulga

Key Points:

• After four years of high-intensity war, Ukraine cannot sustain its defence without sufficiently expanding its military’s size and appropriately resting the individuals who have been a part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) since the beginning of 2022, or even 2014.
• While mobilization could, in theory, provide AFU with the numbers that it needs to enable these two aims, the current system has fallen well short of these numbers due to a combination of evasion, desertion, and absence without leave. In addition, mobilisation in its current form can (partially) meet quotas, but not necessarily competencies or the need for an adequately motivated force.
• Accordingly, efforts to address Ukraine’s critical manpower shortage should prioritize professionalisation of all occupational specialties and the Ministry of Defence’s (UMOD) personnel management system, with complementary policies that address the separate categories of civilian specialists who will serve in noncombat roles and civilians who will serve in combat (particularly infantry) positions. This must include initiatives to restore trust in military leadership.
• Standardisation of contracts and terms of service should apply regardless of whether an individual in an occupational speciality volunteer or is mobilised. Further, in the interests of fairness and internal cohesion, policies that propose new systems of entitlements or contractual arrangements for new servicemembers must in some way provide commensurate benefits and terms to individuals who were already serving prior to the given policy’s date of implementation. Given recent missteps with policies designed to attract new recruits, UMOD should make highly visible policies aimed at taking care of long-serving volunteers (those who joined in 2022 or earlier).

CSNS

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