Psychological Intergroup Interventions in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Why They Matter, What Works, What Doesn’t and How to Deploy Safely
By Andrés Casas and Boaz Hameiri
Executive Summary
- We highlight a central paradox: many psychological intergroup interventions in fragile and conflict‑affected states (FCAS) fail not because of ill intent, but because they overlook the psychological, social and contextual determinants of human behaviour.
- Psychological intergroup interventions are theory‑driven, empirically tested strategies that aim to change attitudes, emotions, perceived norms, and behaviours that sustain intergroup hostility and discrimination. In FCAS contexts, marked by weak institutions, legacies of violence and deep distrust, these interventions address psychological barriers to peace alongside material constraints.
- Psychological intergroup interventions can shift behaviours relevant to violence, coexistence and political compromise in FCASs, but effects are highly context‑dependent and often uneven across groups in complex conflict scenarios.
- This paper examines interventions that are proven relevant to stabilisation policy, and realistic pathways to scale through humanitarian, governance, security and economic programmes.
- Low‑cost, scalable interventions (social norms; meta‑perception correction; belief malleability; mass media) show the strongest evidence‑to‑cost ratios.
- High‑intensity interventions (contact; empathy) can be effective but pose political, ethical and security risks if poorly sequenced.
- Behavioural change often occurs without attitudinal change – this has implications for monitoring, evaluation and expectations.
- Poorly designed interventions risk reinforcing power asymmetries, legitimising unjust settlements or triggering backlash in conflict‑affected populations.
- Evidence supports layered, sequenced intervention portfolios, rather than single ‘silver bullet’ approaches.
- Psychological intergroup interventions are not substitutes for political settlements or institutional reform, but they are force multipliers when deployed carefully.
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This publication is issued by the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK International Development. XCEPT brings together world-leading experts and local researchers to examine conflict-affected borderlands, how conflicts connect across borders, the intersection of climate stresses and conflict, and the drivers of violent and peaceful behaviour, to inform policies and programmes that support peace.
The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the UK government.
This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s) should be credited, with the date of the publication and reference to XCEPT. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the material in this document, the author(s) will not be liable for any loss or damages incurred through the use of this document.
